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Kernel & Low-Level

Linux Bluetooth deferred accept skips required security

A classic L2CAP listener using deferred setup can keep a live data channel after authentication fails.

A flaw in the Linux kernel's Bluetooth L2CAP layer lets a peer keep a connected, data-passing channel even after it fails the security level a service required. Mohammed reported the issue on 18 November 2026 and posted a fix separately.

Services that listen with deferred setup are supposed to decide which peer to admit, while the kernel still enforces the socket's security level before the connection is completed. On classic Bluetooth that does not happen. The incoming channel becomes readable to a poll-driven server before link security has finished. If the server accepts and reads in that window, the kernel answers the peer with success and never consults the required security level.

If authentication then fails, nothing tears the channel down. The kernel has no path that matches a failed security result on a connection that has already been completed. A failed authentication is enough; the peer does not need a pairing that protects against man-in-the-middle attacks.

The bug is in current mainline and is reachable without a custom daemon. BlueZ's own classic Bluetooth profile servers listen this way through its standard listen API.